If their content does not take into account the stringency of the obligations, what happens then? A historically important theory, although largely non-existent, explained it in relation to punishment. Echoing Hobbes and Bentham, English lawyer John Austin says that having a legal obligation means being submissive, making or enduring a sovereign order when an order requires an expression of will, as well as an associated risk, however small, of suffering harm for non-compliance. “When I speak directly of the possibility of suffering evil or (changing the expression) of responsibility or odiousness towards evil, I use the term duty or the term obligation … (Austin 1832, 18). Others have conceived an indirect link between duty and punishment. Hans Kelsen is of the opinion that what is normally considered the content of a legal obligation is in reality only part of a triggering condition of the peremptory norm that orders or authorizes civil servants to impose a sanction: “[A] norm: `Thou shalt not kill` is superfluous if a norm is valid: `Whoever murders must be punished`” (Kelsen 1967, 55). And so: “The legal obligation is not or not immediately the conduct that should be. Only the coercive act that acts as a sanction should be” (Kelsen 1967, 119). One of the first known classifications was made by Gaius in its institutions, which divided the obligations into obligations ex contractu (obligations arising from legal action) and obligations ex delicto (obligations arising from illegal and illegal acts). However, since this classification is clearly too vague, Gaius, in his book Res cottidinanae Gaius, classified all obligations in the above-mentioned ex contractu and ex delicto obligations, as well as in the obligations ex variis causarum figuris, which was a heterogeneous category intended to include all cases of obligations that did not result from infringements or contracts.

This can confirm our confidence in the correlative view of the obligation to know that philosophical reflection on political authority has focused from the earliest times on the commitment to obedience. Passive commitment to obedience is certainly not all we owe to the law (Parekh 1993, 243; Green 2003, 543-47), but many saw it as the minimum requirement of the law. This leads to a mystery. Wolff puts it this way: “If the individual retains his autonomy by reserving the final decision on cooperation, he thus denies the authority of the state; On the other hand, he submits to the state and accepts his claim to authority, then. it loses its autonomy” (Wolff 1970, p. 9). Wolff solves the dilemma in favor of autonomy and defends anarchism on this basis. “If I obey the government, this is an absurd question. We have not understood what it means to be a member of a political society if we assume that political engagement is something we may not have had and therefore must be justified” (McPherson 1967, 64).

From this point of view, the many attempts to find independent moral principles to justify commitment are not only false, they are conceptually confused; they show a “symptom of philosophical disorder” (Pitkin 1965, 75). The issue is resolved by dealing with the meaning of “member”. It`s hard to find philosophers who still believe that normative questions can be solved by linguistic considerations, but there are surprisingly some who think this argumentation strategy is essentially correct. Ronald Dworkin, for example, asserts that “political associations, such as family or friendship, and other more local and intimate forms of trade unionism, are themselves pregnant with the obligation” (Dworkin 1986, 206). His obstetrical theory is parthenogenetic: politics is a form of association that carries obligations in itself. In a virgin birth, the obligation has no father among the known moral principles such as consent, utility, fairness and so on. We justify it by showing that it is a kind of “associative” or “community” commitment that is constitutive of a particular type of community. In the most technical definition, the obligation refers to a sealed instrument. In black`s Law Dictionary, the obligation is a moral or legal obligation to perform or not to perform an action. Some jurists, including Fredrick Pollock, argue that commitment is another word for duty.

The legal meaning of the obligation in ancient Roman law states that obligations are the bond of vinculum juris or legal necessity between at least two persons or parties. 2. “Conditional obligation” means the obligation to pay or perform certain acts that depend on the occurrence of an event. This touches on a methodological issue in the philosophy of law. Some believe that the character of the authority of the law is a matter of descriptive analysis, defined by the semantic and logical limits of the official language and the traditions of argumentation. Others argue that such an analysis is impossible or indefinite, and that we are therefore led to normative arguments about what legal authority should be (see Soper 2002; Finnis 1979, pp. 12-15). Generally speaking, they think that we should understand the law in such a way that it only claims the kind of authority it would justify for the law. This is the motivation for Friedrich Hayek`s suggestion that “the ideal type of law […] merely provides additional information to be taken into account in the actor`s decision” (Hayek 1960, 150).

Hayek advocates the free market and concludes that the nature of legal authority must be understood in a similar way. The most radical position of its kind is that of Ronald Dworkin. He prefers what he calls a more “relaxed” understanding of legal authority (Dworkin 1986:429). Others have argued that the preventive notion of authority is not satisfactory because it is too rigid (e.g., Perry, 1989). Dworkin`s objection goes much further. His position is not that the law merely conveys a weaker form of leadership; It is that the law should not be understood as trying to communicate anything. A subject who considers his legal obligations does not listen to the law; he is involved in “a conversation with himself” and “tries to discover his own intention, to maintain and participate in this practice” (Dworkin 1986, 58). From this point of view, there is no fact about what the law claims, which is independent of what everyone does well to consider as a claim.

But even in its limited role, the approval has drawn sharp criticism. (For a good overview, see Simmons 1979, 57-100; for a qualified defense, see Beran 1987.) These focus on whether it is actually given and, if it is given, whether it would bind. Consent is not mere consensus or consent; It is a performance obligation that assumes an obligation by the act of consent itself. However, as with other promises and oaths, there are limits to its validity. We must ensure that consent is not rejected by mistake, coercion or coercion. It must also respect the material limits of its validity. Locke argues that one cannot accept to be killed, and therefore not to slavery and therefore nothing like slavery, including absolute government. One can think of an argument similar to the conclusion that political approval must be revocable. But while we integrate all these conditions of validity, the commitment itself seems to do less and less work. Pitkin thinks this becomes “essentially irrelevant” in Locke`s version (Pitkin 1965, 57).

Consent is saved from insignificance only if we can explain why we also appreciate the power to engage in obedience. David Hume could not think of any reason: keeping his promises is an “artificial virtue” that serves the common good, as well as obedience to the law. As long as the law is tolerable – and Hume is willing to give it a very broad bow – a promise to obey it is superfluous, for any plausible answer to the question of why we are bound by the promise would have “immediately, without any circle, declared our commitment to loyalty”; “Since we are of equal strength and authority, we gain nothing by dissolving into each other” (Hume 1985, 481). However, a theory of consent does not need to “dissolve” loyalty into a promise – there may also be non-promissory conditions for obedience – but it does need to explain why it should depend on it. Three types of arguments were popular. First, there are crucial reasons for wanting conscious accountability control for legal obligations. In political authority, where the stakes are as high as they come, the power to give and deny consent fulfills an ultimate protective function that goes beyond what we can expect from the fallible institutions of limited government. Second, consent allows people to establish political loyalties by creating new political societies or joining existing ones, without waiting for the gradual emergence of bonds of communion and reciprocity; Consent is an instant passport to “perfect membership” in a Commonwealth.

(Locke: § 119). Third, although consent is defined by its performative character, it naturally accompanies secondary non-performative characteristics: consent also expresses the acceptance or at least the tolerability of government. This can mark consent-compliant leaders as standing out among a number of possible contenders, and it can signal that they have a good chance of being effective, which in itself is a necessary condition for justifying any political authority. The obligation is the moral or legal obligation that requires of a person, as well as the possible sanctions in case of non-performance. An obligation is also an obligation to do what is imposed by a contract, promise or law. In the most general sense, duty is synonymous with duty. If you become more technical, the obligation refers to the obligation that requires a party to perform a task, perform an action, or pay a required amount of money in accordance with the customs and laws of the country in which the agreement was entered into. Consent presupposes that the duties of obedience must somehow be assumed by actions whose purpose is to assume an obligation. There are weaker forms of voluntarism. Some relationships that one can freely enter (or at least leave) are characterized by commitments.